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The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Reappraisal 
 
 
Peter A. Metofe  




The cognitive dissonance theory, as postulated by Festinger (1957), has undergone increased 
scrutiny since its development. Through a reappraisal of this theory as explicated by other 
researchers, specifically relying on extant and current research in this theory, coupled with 
recent developments, this paper provides a context for better understanding of how individuals 
experience cognitive dissonance and its implications for clinical practice. 
 




The cognitive dissonance theory as postulated by Festinger 
(1957) has been undergoing increased scrutiny since its devel-
opment. How we experience cognitive dissonance has been a 
fertile ground for a plethora of studies in social psychology. 
Some of the findings from these studies as to how we experi-
ence cognitive dissonance have led credence to Festinger's 
conceptualization of dissonance, and while others (e.g., Bem, 
1967) have not provided empirical support of how we experi-
ence dissonance as explained by Festinger. Through a reap-
praisal of this theory as explicated by other researchers, this 
paper provides a context for better understanding of how indi-
viduals experience cognitive dissonance and its implications for 
clinical practice. Specifically, this paper sheds light on con-
tradictory and somewhat complementary explanations of how 
we experience cognitive dissonance.  
Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable feeling caused 
by holding two contradictory ideas simultaneously. The theory 
of cognitive dissonance proposes that people have a motiva-
tional drive to reduce dissonance by changing their attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviors, or by justifying or rationalizing them 
(Brehm, 1956; Festinger, 1957). In this context, dissonance 
occurs when a person perceives a logical inconsistency in their 
beliefs, when one idea implies the opposite of another. The dis-
sonance might be experienced as guilt, anger, frustration, or 
even embarrassment. 
 
Classic Experiment of Cognitive Dissonance 
 
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) conducted a classic exper-
iment of cognitive dissonance. In this experiment, students 
were asked to spend an hour on boring and tedious tasks (e.g., 
turning pegs a quarter turn, over and over again). The tasks were 
designed to generate a strong, negative attitude. Once the  
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participants had done this, the experimenters asked some of 
them to do a simple favor. They were asked to talk to another 
subject (actually an actor) and persuade them that the tasks were 
interesting and engaging. Some participants were paid $20 for 
this favor, others were paid $1, and a control group was not 
asked to perform the favor.  
When asked to rate the boring tasks at the conclusion of the 
study (not in the presence of the other subject), those in the $1 
group rated them more positively than those in the $20 and 
control groups. This was explained by Festinger and Carlsmith 
(1959) as evidence for cognitive dissonance. The researchers 
theorized that people experienced dissonance between the con-
flicting cognitions, "I told someone that the task was interest-
ing" and "I actually found it boring" (p. 207). When paid only 
$1, students were forced to internalize the attitude they were 
induced to express, because they had no other justification. 
Those in the $20 condition, however, had an obvious external 
justification for their behavior, and thus experienced less disso-
nance. 
 
Alternative Explanations of Dissonance 
 
Daryl Bem (1967) was an early critic of cognitive disso-
nance theory. He proposed self-perception theory as a more 
parsimonious alternative explanation of the experimental 
results. According to him, people do not think much about their 
attitudes, let alone whether they are in conflict. He interpreted 
people in the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study as inferring 
their attitudes from their behavior. Thus, when asked "Did you 
find the task interesting?" they decided that they must have 
found it interesting because that is what they told someone 
(Bem, p. 183). Bem suggested that people paid $20 had a 
salient, external incentive for their behavior and were likely to 
perceive the money as their reason for saying the task was 
interesting, rather than concluding that they actually found it 
interesting.  
In many experimental situations, Bem's theory and 
Festinger's theory make identical predictions, but only disso-









arousal. Lab experiments have verified the presence of arousal 
in dissonance situations (Zanna & Cooper, 1974; Kiesler & 
Pallak, 1976). This provides support for cognitive dissonance 
theory and makes it unlikely that self-perception by itself can 
account for all the laboratory findings.  
Aronson (1969) reformulated the basic theory of cognitive dis-
sonance by linking it to the self-concept. According to this new 
interpretation, cognitive dissonance does not arise because 
people experience dissonance between conflicting cognitions. 
Instead, it occurs when people see their actions as conflicting 
with their normally positive view of themselves. Thus, in the 
original Festinger and Carlsmith study, Aronson stated that the 
dissonance was between the cognition, "I am an honest person" 
and the cognition, "I lied to someone about finding the task 
interesting" (p. 27). Other psychologists have argued that 
maintaining cognitive consistency is a way to protect public 
self-image, rather than private self-concept (Tedeschi, Schlen-
ker, & Bonoma, 1971).  
Cooper and Fazio (1984) argued that dissonance was 
caused by aversive consequences, rather than inconsistency. 
According to this interpretation, the fact that lying is wrong and 
hurtful, not the consistency between cognitions is what makes 
people feel bad. Subsequent research, however, found that 
people experience dissonance even when they feel they have 
not done anything wrong (Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Green-berg, 
Simon, & Nelson, 1996).  
Chen and Risen (2010) have criticized the free-choice 
paradigm and have suggested that the Rank, Choice, Rank 
method of studying dissonance is invalid. They argue that 
research design relies on the assumption that, if the subject rates 
options differently in the second survey, then the subject's 
attitudes toward the options have therefore changed. They show 
that there are other reasons one might get different rank-ings in 
the second survey - perhaps the participants were largely 
indifferent between choices. However, some follow-up 
research has provided contradictory evidence to this account 
(Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 2007). Also, more recent studies have 
demonstrated the biological bases of how cognitive disso-nance 
is experienced (e.g., Monroe & Read, 2008; Van Veen, Krug, 




In recent times, social psychological experiments have 
provided impetus for the sustained interest in cognitive disso-
nance and, consequently, challenged the revisions of disso-
nance theory and provided empirical support for Festinger's 
original conceptualization of dissonance. On the basis of these 
profound experiments, dissonance reflects inconsistency and is 
at variance with self-threat or the production of an aversive 
consequence. According to Aronson (1992), a number of social 
psychological theories, including self affirmation theory, could 
be conceptualized as dissonance in the form of guilt. In addi-
tion to the theories postulated by Aronson, much research and 
theory concerned with guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heather-
ton, 1994) and self-regulation over prejudiced and other 
impulses (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, Devine, Curtin, Hartley, & 




Festinger (1957) failed to explicate why cognitive incon-
sistency produces discomfort and motivates perceptual, cogni-
tive and behavioral changes. Nevertheless, research on the 
action-based model (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002) 
suggests cognitive inconsistency produces a negative emotive 
state that causes cognitive and behavioral changes. Specifi-
cally, the action - based model suggests a new way of thinking 
about cognitive dissonance processes; it states that dissonance 
processes may serve the necessary and vital function of assist-
ing in the execution of effective and unconflicted behavior. It is 
incumbent upon social psychological researchers to include 
these ideas from action-based model into future research in 
cognitive dissonance.  
As continued interest in dissonance theory is sustained, it is 
clear that this theory has faced many challenges in terms of its 
conjectures, but still provides empirical foundation for gen-erating 
new hypotheses that lend themselves to testing. Against this 
backdrop, it is instructive to note that recent empirical and 
theoretical developments within dissonance theory will shed more 
light on how we conceptualize Festinger's theory.  
In conclusion, this paper did not provide an exhaustive 
review of the literature of how we experience dissonance, but 
only a sample of the literature. However, the review of the lit-
erature presented here underscores the importance of comple-
mentary explanations of dissonance, and these explanations on 
how individuals experience cognitive dissonance has one com-
mon thread. This indicates that people experience dissonance 
and the source of the components of this dissonance might be 
different for individuals. Against this backdrop, are there any 
clinical implications resulting from cognitive dissonance? For-
tunately, the answer is yes. For example, how one experiences 
cognitive dissonance may have utility in the clinical interven-
tion of individuals suffering from anxiety and other maladjust-
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